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Abstract
The measure problem of cosmology is how to obtain normalized proba-
bilities of observations from the quantum state of the universe. This is par-
ticularly a problem when eternal inflation leads to a universe of unbounded
size so that there are apparently infinitely many realizations or occurrences of
observations of each of many different kinds or types, making the ratios am-
biguous. There is also the danger of domination by Boltzmann Brains. Here
two new Spacetime Average Density (SAD) measures are proposed, Maximal
Average Density (MAD) and Biased Average Density (BAD), for getting a
finite number of observation occurrences by using properties of the Space-
time Average Density (SAD) of observation occurrences to restrict to finite
regions of spacetimes that have a preferred beginning or bounce hypersurface.
These measures avoid Boltzmann brain domination and appear to give results
consistent with other observations that are problematic for other widely used
measures, such as the observation of a positive cosmological constant.
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1 Introduction
Theoretical cosmology is plagued with the measure problem, the problem of how
to predict the probabilities of observations in the universe from the quantum state
(or from some other such input). (See [1] for a fairly recent review, and see the
2014 June 2 Version 1 of this paper on the arXiv for a list of 245 references that I
had found then that seemed to be related to the measure problem, though it was
viewed as editorially inadvisable to include this excessively long list in the published
version of this paper.) This problem is particularly severe for universes that contain
infinitely many observations of each of more than one kind, for then one has the
ambiguity of taking ratios of infinite numbers. However, there is also the challenge
even for large finite universes, because of the failure of Born’s rule [2, 3, 4, 5].
A solution to the measure problem should not only be able to give normalized
probabilities for observations (that is, normalized so that the sum over all possible
observations is unity, not just the sum over all the possible observations of one
observer at one time) but also make the normalized probabilities of our observations
not too small. One can take the normalized probability of one’s observation as given
by some theory as the likelihood of that theory. (Here a theory includes not only the
quantum state but also the rules for getting the probabilities of observations from it.)
Then if one weights the likelihoods of different theories by the prior probabilities
one assigns to them and normalizes the resulting product, one gets the posterior
probabilities of the theories. One would like to find theories, including their solutions
to the measure problem, that give high posterior probabilities.
A major threat to getting high posterior probabilities for theories is the possibil-
ity that they may predict that observations are dominated by those of Boltzmann
brains that arise from thermal and/or vacuum fluctuations [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36].
Most such Boltzmann brain observations seem likely to be much more disordered
than ours, so if the probabilities of our ordered observations are diluted by Boltz-
mann brain observations in theories in which they dominate the probabilities, that
would greatly reduce the likelihood of such theories. Therefore, one seeks theories
with solutions to the measure problem that suppress Boltzmann brains if this can be
done without too great a cost in complexity that would tend to suppress the prior
probabilities assigned to such theories.
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Most proposed solutions to the measure problem of cosmology tend to lean to-
ward one or the other of two extremes. Some, particularly those proposed by Hartle,
Hawking, Hertog, and/or Srednicki [37, 38, 39, 40, 21, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,
49, 50, 51, 52], which often apply the consistent histories or decohering histories for-
malism [53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66] to the Hartle-Hawking
no-boundary proposal for the quantum state of the universe [67], tend to suggest
that the measure is determined nearly uniquely by the quantum state (at least if a
fairly-unique typicality assumption is made [21, 46, 48]). Others, particularly those
proposed in the large fraction of papers cited in Version 1 of this paper for the mea-
sure problem that are focused on eternal inflation, tend to suggest that the quantum
state is mostly irrelevant and that the results depend mainly on how the measure
is chosen in the asymptotic future of an eternally inflating spacetime. Here, moti-
vated by considerations I have expressed previously on Born’s rule [2, 3, 4, 5], on
connecting observations to the quantum state [68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75], and on
whether observational probabilities can be independent of the quantum state [76], I
shall steer a middle course and suggest that both the quantum state and the mea-
sure are crucial, further suggesting that the measure is dominated by observations
not too late in the spacetime.
If the gross asymptotic behavior of an eternally inflating universe is insensitive to
the details of the quantum state (say other than requiring that the state be within
some open set), then I would think it implausible that the relative probabilities of
observations would depend only on the gross asymptotic behavior of the universe.
Therefore, I do not favor measures that have temporal cutoffs that are eventually
taken to infinity and have the property that for a very large finite cutoff they depend
mainly on the properties of the spacetime at very large times (e.g., times near the
cutoff). If there is a time-dependent weighting to the measure, I suspect that it
should not depend mainly on the asymptotic behavior. In particular, I am sceptical
of the specific form of “Assumption 3. Typicality.” of Freivogel [1] that “we are
equally likely to be anywhere consistent with our data . . . [so that with] a finite
probability for eternal inflation, which results in an infinite number of observations,
. . . we can ignore any finite number of observations.” In a footnote to this statement,
Freivogel admits, “This conclusion relies on an assumption about how to implement
the typicality assumption when there is a probability distribution over how many
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observations occur [5].” In this paper I shall reject this assumption, which Freivogel
notes [1] that I have called “observational averaging” [5], and instead investigate
non-uniform measures over spacetimes that suppress the asymptotic behavior.
As an example of what I mean, in [77] (see also [2, 3, 4, 78] for further discussion
and motivation) I proposed volume averaging instead of volume weighting to avoid
divergences in the measure of Boltzmann brain observations on spatial hypersurfaces
as they expand to become infinitely large. However, summing up over all hypersur-
faces still gave a divergence if that were done by a uniform integral over proper time
t and if indeed the proper time goes to infinity. One could make this integral finite
by cutting it off at some finite upper bound to the proper time, say t∗, but then as
t∗ is taken to infinity, asymptotically half of the integral would be given by times
within a factor of two of the temporal cutoff t∗. Therefore, as t∗ is taken to infinity,
the relative probabilities will be determined by the asymptotic behavior of the space-
time. For example, if it were an asymptotically de Sitter spacetime that does not
have bubble nucleation to new hot big bang regions that lead to a sufficiently large
number of ordinary observers, the relative probabilities will apparently be domi-
nated by Boltzmann brains in the asymptotic de Sitter spacetime. Even if de Sitter
keeps nucleating new big bangs at a sufficient rate for ordinary observers produced
by these big bangs to dominate over Boltzmann brains in the expanding regions
that remain asymptotically de Sitter, if a transition occurs to Minkowski spacetime
that cannot nucleate new big bangs, and if Boltzmann brains can indeed form in
the vacuum state in Minkowski spacetime [9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 24, 26, 30, 33, 34, 36],
they will eventually dominate over ordinary observers if the weighting is uniform
over proper time up to some cutoff t∗ that is taken to infinity.
Therefore, in [34] I proposed Agnesi weighting, integrating over dt/(1+ t2) (with
the proper time t measured in Planck units) rather than over dt, the uniform integral
over proper time. In this case the measure will be dominated by finite times even
without a cutoff. Alternatively, if one did continue to use a cutoff t∗, the range of
times which dominates the integral will not grow indefinitely as t∗ is taken to infinity
but instead will remain at fixed finite times (assuming a measure on hypersurfaces
that does not diverge as the hypersurfaces become larger and larger).
When Agnesi weighting [34] is combined with volume averaging [77, 78], it ap-
pears to be statistically consistent with all observations and seems to give much
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higher likelihoods than measures using the approaches of Hartle, Hawking, Hertog,
and/or Srednicki. It does not require the unproven hypothesis that bubble nucle-
ation rates for new big bangs are higher than Boltzmann brain nucleation rates
[79, 12, 80, 31, 1], as the most popular eternal inflation measures require [1]. It also
does not lead to measures dominated by observations of a negative cosmological
constant [81, 82, 1], which is contrary to what our observations give. Therefore, for
fitting observations without needing to invoke unproven hypotheses, it seems to be
the best measure proposed so far.
On the other hand, Agnesi weighting is admittedly quite ad hoc, so there is no
obvious reason why it should be right. Ideally one would like to find a measure that
is more compellingly elegant and simple and which also gives high likelihoods for
theories using it and also having elegant and simple quantum states. However, since
none of us have found such a measure, it may be worthwhile to investigate other
alternatives to Agnesi weighting.
2 Spacetime Average Density (SAD) Measures
Here I wish to propose new solutions to the measure problem with a weighted
distribution over variable, rather than fixed, proper-time cutoffs depending on the
spacetime average density of observation occurrences up to the cutoff. The ad hoc
weighting function dt/(1 + t2) of Agnesi weighting will be eliminated, though at
the cost of two different rather ad hoc algorithms for constructing a weighting over
proper time to damp the late-time contribution to the measure for observations.
Let me use the index i to denote the theory Ti, which I take to include not only
the quantum state of the universe but also the rules for getting the probabilities of
the observations from the quantum state. I shall assume that the quantum state
given by i gives, as the expectation value of some positive operator depending upon
the spacetime and perhaps also upon the theory, a relative probability distribution
or measure µij for different quasiclassical inextendible spacetimes Sj, labeled by
the index j, that each has definite occurrences of the observation Ok, labeled by
the index k, occurring within the spacetime at definite location regions that I shall
assume are much smaller than the spacetime itself and so can be idealized to be at
points within the spacetime. Because each spacetime includes definite observation
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occurrences at definite locations, it is not simply a manifold with a metric (though
it needs to have that as well) but is a spacetime description of all the observation
occurrences within it.
I should note that k labels the complete content of the observation Ok (which
is generically not sufficient to specify uniquely the location of an occurrence of the
observation Ok within a spacetime Sj), so that there can be multiple occurrences of
the observation Ok at different locations within the spacetime. However, since I am
assuming that different observations as such are intrinsically distinguished only by
their content and not by their locations, the probability of an observation Ok given
by a theory Ti,
Pik = P (Ok|Ti), (1)
is the total normalized measure for all occurrences of the observation Ok at all the
different locations at which the observation occurs in each spacetime Sj and in all
spacetimes Sj given by the quantum state specified by the theory Ti in which the
observation occurs. Besides specifying the quantum state, a theory Ti must also
specify how to get the total measure for the observation Ok from the quantum state.
In the present proposals, I am assuming that this measure is obtained by a suitably
weighted sum (depending on the spacetime Sj that specifies not only a geometry
but also the locations and types of all observation occurrences within it) of the
occurrences of the observation Ok within a spacetime Sj , further weighted by the
measure µij for the spacetime Sj in the quantum state given by the theory Ti, and
then summed over all spacetimes Sj. I shall also assume that the measure µij is a lin-
ear functional of the quantum state, given by the expectation value in the quantum
state of a suitable positive operator for the existence of that spacetime. Then the
probability Pik of the observation Ok given the theory Ti would be the normalized
expectation value of some positive operator (depending upon the operators for the
existence of the spacetimes Sj and upon the weighting for the observation Ok that
may occur multiple times within various ones of these spacetimes), as proposed in
my formalism for what I have called Sensible Quantum Mechanics [69, 70, 71, 72, 74]
or Mindless Sensationalism [73, 75].
I shall also assume that each such spacetime Sj with positive measure µij in the
theories Ti that I shall be considering is globally hyperbolic with compact Cauchy
surfaces and has the equivalent of an initial compact Cauchy hypersurface, either
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the Terminally Indecomposable Future Set (TIFS) [83, 84] of a big bang, or the
extremal hypersurface of globally minimum volume for spacetime with a bounce.
Then I shall introduce a time function t that is the supremum of the absolute value
of the proper time of any causal curve from the point where it is evaluated to this
preferred initial hypersurface. Next, evaluate the 4-volume Vj(t) of the spacetime
region, say Rjt, in the spacetime Sj that is within a time t or less of the preferred
initial hypersurface, and the number Njk(t) of occurrences of the observation Ok
that occur within this spacetime region Rjt that are of type k. The sum of the
number of occurrences of all observation types Ok that occur within this spacetime
region of spacetime Sj up to time t is
Nj(t) =
∑
k
Njk(t). (2)
A subtlety is the fact that presumably different types of observations Ok have
different measures as well as different spacetime frequencies of occurring. Therefore,
Njk should not literally be the number of occurrences of the observation Ok, but
some sort of weighted number, weighted by some factor that depends upon the
particular observation type Ok [69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 85, 74, 75, 86]. For example,
one might suppose that on earth there are far more ant observations than human
observations, but it seems plausible that most human observations have much greater
weight than most ant observations (perhaps correlated with the generally increased
complexity of human observations over ant observations, though I do not know of
any unique obvious detailed form for this correlation). Then the weighted number
Njk of human observations could be greater than that of ant observations, despite the
greater number of ant observations if they were simply counted equally weighted,
helping to make it not statistically surprising why we find ourselves experiencing
human observations rather than ant observations. Henceforth I shall assume that
the numbers of occurrences Njk in the spacetime Sj of the observation Ok, and
the total number of occurrences in that spacetime of all observations, are weighted
numbers of occurrences.
From these quantities, calculate the Spacetime Average Density of occurrences
of the observation Ok of type k for the spacetime region Rjt of 4-volume Vj(t) within
time t of the preferred initial hypersurface in the spacetime Sj,
n¯jk(t) = Njk(t)/Vj(t). (3)
7
The sum of these over all observation types Ok is the total Spacetime Average
Density of all observation occurrences in the spacetime region Rjt,
n¯j(t) =
∑
k
n¯jk(t) = Nj(t)/Vj(t). (4)
I shall call this the SAD of that region, or the SAD function of t for the spacetime
Sj.
Now I wish to construct spacetime analogues of spatial volume averaging [77],
weighting each observation Ok by some form of its Spacetime Average Density.
The simplest procedure would appear to be to take the full Spacetime Average
Density of each observation Ok over all of each spacetime Sj and then weight by
the quantum measures µij that the theory Ti assigns to that spacetime. However,
if the spacetime extends to arbitrarily large t and asymptotes in some region that
locally approaches the vacuum with a positive density per 4-volume of Boltzmann
brains, the full Spacetime Average Density will be dominated by Boltzmann brain
observations that are presumably nearly all highly disordered. Then the normalized
probabilities of ordered observations such as our own would be very low (having
been diluted by the enormous number of disordered observations Ok that each have
similar measures if made by Boltzmann brains), giving a very low likelihood for such
a theory.
One might suppose that if the quantum measure µij in theory Ti for spacetimes
Sj with finite total ages (finite bounds on the proper time t) is not so small, rel-
ative to the measure of spacetimes that last forever, as the ratio of the Spacetime
Average Density of ordinary observers in the finite-age spacetimes to the Spacetime
Average Density of Boltzmann brains in the infinite-age spacetimes, that then when
weighted by the Spacetime Average Density of all observations, the finite-age ones
will dominate, giving a cosmic doomsday argument for a spacetime with a finite
total age, as indeed I have previously proposed [87]. However, like many of the
current inflationary universe measures [81, 82, 1], this appears to be dominated by
observations of a negative cosmological constant, contrary to what we see, so in this
paper I shall seek other measures that avoid this problem.
Therefore, I shall seek a weighting over different spacetime regions that avoids
domination by both Boltzmann brains and by a negative cosmological constant.
The Spacetime Average Density over spacetime regions Rjt for certain reasonable
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values of t that are of the same order as what is believed to be the present age
of our universe, about 14 billion years, would seem to be dominated by ordinary
observations and not by Boltzmann brains, at least for a suitable quantum state
of the universe (though perhaps not for the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal
[67], which seems to predict mostly nearly empty de Sitter spacetime that would
apparently be dominated by Boltzmann brains even for times much shorter than
the time needed for Boltzmann brains to dominate in a universe that starts with a
hot big bang [13]). However, I do not want to introduce some fixed parameter value
for what t is for the spacetime regions Rjt to be used for the Spacetime Average
Densities of the various observations.
Instead, I shall seek a measure to be given in terms of an auxiliary function
fij(t), determined both by the theory Ti and by the spacetime Sj existing within
the theory with quantum measure µij, which increases monotonically from 0 to 1
as t ranges from 0 to ∞ within the spacetime Sj. (If t runs only from 0 to tj <∞
for some spacetimes Sj , I shall require that fij(t) increase monotonically from 0 to
1 as t increases from 0 to tj and then stay at 1 for all values of t greater than tj
that do not actually occur within the spacetime Sj, so that for simplicity I can take
t running from 0 to ∞ for each spacetime.) I shall then assume that equal ranges
of fij(t) contribute equally to the measure in choosing the value of t used to cutoff
the spacetime.
First I shall explain more explicitly how to use fij(t) to get the measure, and
then I shall postulate different ways (labeled by the index i in the theory Ti that
includes not only the quantum measures µij for the different spacetimes Sj but also
the rules for getting the measure for converting the quantum state to observational
probabilities) to get the auxiliary function fij(t) from the SAD function n¯j(t) for the
spacetime Sj. In particular, I shall propose that the weighted Spacetime Average
Density for the occurrences of the observation Ok in theory Ti and in spacetime Sj
with auxiliary function fij(t) is
n¯ijk =
∫
∞
0
dt
dfij
dt
n¯jk(t) =
∫
∞
0
dt
dfij
dt
Njk(t)
Vj(t)
. (5)
The weighted Spacetime Average Density in theory Ti and spacetime Sj for all
observations Ok is the sum of this over the k that labels the observations:
n¯ij =
∑
k
n¯ijk =
∫
∞
0
dt
dfij
dt
n¯j(t) =
∫
∞
0
dt
dfij
dt
Nj(t)
Vj(t)
. (6)
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Next, to include the quantum measure µij that the theory Ti assigns to the
spacetime Sk, I propose that the unnormalized measure or relative probability pik
in theory Ti of the observation Ok is the sum of the weighted Spacetime Average
Densities further weighted by the quantum measures:
pik =
∑
j
µijn¯ijk. (7)
Finally, dividing by the normalization factor
pi =
∑
k
pik =
∑
j
µijn¯ij (8)
gives the normalized probability in the theory Ti of the observation Ok as
Pik ≡ P (Ok|Ti) = pik
pi
=
∑
j µijn¯ijk∑
j,k µijn¯ijk
. (9)
Of course, it remains to be said what different theories Ti give for the way to get
the auxiliary function fij(t) from the SAD function n¯j(t) for the spacetime Sj .
2.1 Maximal Average Density (MAD) Measure
First, consider theories Ti that employ what I shall call the Maximal Average Den-
sity (MAD) measure. These make use of the time t∗j that is the value of t that
gives the global maximum value of the SAD function of t for the spacetime Sj ,
n¯j(t) = Nj(t)/Vj(t), the Spacetime Average Density of the total occurrences of all
observations up to proper time t in the spacetime Sj . That is, n¯j(t) ≤ n¯j(t∗j) for
all t in the spacetime Sj. (For simplicity, I shall assume that there is zero quantum
measure µij for spacetimes with more than one value of t∗j at which n¯j(t) attains
its global maximum, so that n¯j(t) < n¯j(t∗j) for all t 6= t∗j in all spacetimes Sj with
positive measures.)
In particular, the Maximal Average Density or MAD measure is the one in which
fij(t) = θ(t− t∗j), (10)
the Heaviside step function, being 0 for times t before the global maximum for n¯j(t)
and being 1 for times after this global maximum. Then dfij/dt = δ(t− t∗j), a Dirac
delta function centered on the global maximum for n¯j(t) for the spacetime Sj, so
Eq. (5) gives
n¯ijk = n¯jk(t∗j). (11)
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This then leads to the normalized probability for the observation Ok given a MAD
theory Ti as being
Pik ≡ P (Ok|Ti) =
∑
j µijn¯jk(t∗j)∑
j,k µijn¯jk(t∗j)
. (12)
Of course, there is not a unique MAD theory, since for this MAD function fij(t) =
θ(t − t∗j), there are many different MAD theories giving different quantum states
and hence different quantum measures µij for the spacetimes Sj .
One might suppose that a typical inextendible spacetime which gives a large
contribution to the probability Pik in a plausible theory Ti of a typical human obser-
vation Ok would have something like a big bang at small t (though perhaps actually
a bounce at t = 0 [88]), a relatively low density of observation occurrences until a
period around t ∼ t0 when planets heated by stars exist and have a relatively high
density of observation occurrences produced by life on the warm planets (compared
with that at any greatly different time), and then a density of observation occur-
rences that drops drastically as stars burn out and planets freeze, until the density
of observation occurrences asymptotes to some very tiny but still positive spacetime
density of Boltzmann brain observations. In this case it is plausible to expect that
n¯ij(t) will start very small for small t when the spacetime Sj is too hot for life (and
when life has not had much time to evolve), rise to a maximum at a time t ∼ t0 when
planetary life prevails, and then drops to a very small positive asymptotic constant
when planetary life dies out and Boltzmann brains dominate.
For example, a mnemonic k = 0 ΛCDM Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker
model [89] with Λ = 3H2
∞
≈ (10 Gyr)−2 ≈ ten square attohertz ≈ 3π/(532400)
Planck units (and so fairly accurately applicable to our universe only after the end
of radiation dominance but here used for all times) gives
Vj(t) ≈ V3 (2/27)H−1∞ x(t) ≡ V3 (2/27)H−1∞ [sinh (3H∞t)− 3H∞t] (13)
with V3 the present 3-volume (unknown and perhaps very large because the universe
appears to extend far beyond what we can see of it, though here I shall assume that
it is finite) and x(t) = sinh y(t)− y(t) with y(t) = 3H∞t =
√
3Λ t.
A very crude toy model for the SAD function n¯j(t) for the Spacetime Average
Density of all observations might be
n¯j(t) ∼ A
(
x(t)
1 + x(t)2
+ ǫ
)
, (14)
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where A is an unknown constant that parametrizes the peak density of ordinary
observations that are represented by the first term that rises and then falls, and
where A ǫ is the much, much smaller density of Boltzmann brain observations that
is crudely assumed to be constant. (For a Boltzmann brain that is the vacuum
fluctuation of a human-sized brain, one might expect ǫ ∼ 10−1042 [13].) The total
number of ordinary observation occurrences in this crude model is finite, AV3, but
the total number of Boltzmann brain observations grows linearly with the 4-volume
Vj(t) = V3 x(t) and hence diverges if indeed t and x(t) go to infinity as assumed.
The SAD function rises from A ǫ at t = 0 and x = 0 (probably an overestimate,
as I would suspect that when the universe is extremely dense, Boltzmann brain
production would be suppressed, but since ǫ ≪ 1 I shall ignore this tiny error,
no doubt much smaller than the error of the crude time-dependent term for the
Spacetime Average Density of ordinary observations) monotonically to A(0.5 + ǫ)
at t = t∗j that gives x∗j ≡ x(t∗j) = 1 and then drops monotonically back to A ǫ at
t =∞ that gives x =∞.
Then the MAD measure gives
n¯ij = n¯j(t∗j) = A(0.5 + ǫ). (15)
The first term in the sum corresponds to ordinary observations, and the second
corresponds to Boltzmann brain observations. If all the different spacetimes Sj that
have positive quantum measure µij had SAD functions n¯j(t) that were proportional
to this one (with the same ratio of ordinary and Boltzmann brain observations),
then the total normalized probability for Boltzmann brain observations would be
only ǫ/(0.5 + ǫ) ≈ 2ǫ ≪ 1. Thus the MAD measure would solve the Boltzmann
brain problem, even for models in which Boltzmann brain production is faster than
the production of new bubble universes and even for models that asymptote to
Minkowski spacetime with its infinite spacetime volume and presumed positive den-
sity per 4-volume of Boltzmann brain observations that would cause Boltzmann
brain domination in most other proposed solutions to the measure problem.
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2.2 Biased Average Density (BAD) Measure
Next, consider what I shall call the Biased Average Density (BAD) measure. A
motivation for going from MAD to BAD is that the MAD measure does not give
any weight to observations within a spacetime that is after the time t∗j at which
the SAD, n¯j(t), is maximized. It does not seem very plausible that any observation
occurrence within a spacetime of positive measure would contribute zero weight to
that kind of observation Ok, so the BAD measure replaces the MAD measure by
a weighting that is positive for all observation occurrences within an inextendible
spacetime (except possibly for a set of measure zero). The auxiliary function in the
BAD measure is given by
fij(t) =
∫ t
0
dt′|dn¯j(t′)/dt′|∫
∞
0
dt′|dn¯j(t′)/dt′| , (16)
which again increases monotonically from 0 at t = 0 to 1 at t = ∞, but now con-
tinuously rather than suddenly jumping from 0 to 1 as the MAD auxiliary function
fij(t) = θ(t− t∗j) does.
In particular, if n¯j(t) increases monotonically from n0 at t = 0 to a single local
maximum (the global maximum) value n∗ at t = t∗j and then decreases monotoni-
cally to n∞ at t = ∞ (where for now I am suppressing the overbar and j index on
n¯j(t) at these three special times), then
fij(t) = θ(t∗j − t) n¯j(t)− n0
2n∗ − n0 − n∞ + θ(t− t∗j)
2n∗ − n0 − n¯j(t)
2n∗ − n0 − n∞ , (17)
Then Eq. (6) gives
n¯ij =
2n2
∗
− n2
0
− n2
∞
2(2n∗ − n0 − n∞) . (18)
In the case in which n0 = n∞ (as was assumed above in the crude toy model),
one gets
n¯ij =
1
2
(n∗ + n0). (19)
This is what was assumed above in the crude toy model, which has n0 = n∞ = A ǫ
and n∗ = A(0.5 + ǫ), giving
n¯ij = A(0.25 + ǫ). (20)
Again taking the first term in the sum to correspond to ordinary observations and
the second term to correspond to Boltzmann brain observations, and assuming that
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all the different spacetimes with positive quantum measure given the same ratio of
the first term to the second term, one gets that the total normalized probability for
Boltzmann brain observations in the BAD measure would be ǫ/(0.25+ ǫ) ≈ 4ǫ≪ 1,
roughly twice what it would be in the MAD measure but still extremely small.
Therefore, both the MAD and BAD measures would solve the Boltzmann brain
problem.
3 Conclusions
One might compare the MAD and BAD measures, which are SAD measures using
the Spacetime Average Density, with the Agnesi measure [34], which uses spatial
averaging over hypersurfaces and a weighting of hypersurfaces by the Agnesi function
of time, dt/(1 + t2) with time t in Planck units. In some ways the MAD and BAD
measures appear to have more complicated algorithms, but they do avoid the use of
an explicit ad hoc function of time such as the Agnesi function, though it is one of
the simplest functions that is positive and gives a finite integral over the real axis.
The weighting factor of the Agnesi measure does favor earlier times or young-
ness (as both the MAD and BAD measures do in different ways), but in a fairly
weak or light way, without exponential damping in time. Therefore, it might be
called a Utility Giving Light Youngness (UGLY) measure. As a result, I have now
made alternative proposals for measures that are MAD, BAD, and UGLY. I am still
looking for one that is GOOD in a supreme way of giving a high posterior proba-
bility by both giving a likelihood (probability of one’s observation given the theory
that includes the measure) that is not too low (which it seems that all three of my
proposed measures would do with a suitable quantum state, such as perhaps the
Symmetric Bounce state [88]) and giving a prior probability (assumed to be higher
for simpler or more elegant theories) that is not too low (which my measures might
not be in comparison with a yet unknown measure that one might hope could be
much simpler and more elegant). However, if GOOD were interpreted as simply
meaning Great Ordinary Observer Dominance, then since all three of my proposed
measures suppress Boltzmann brains relative to ordinary observers, one could say
that the MAD, the BAD, and the UGLY are all GOOD.
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